Preliminary Summary and Conclusions

The scope of this analysis is vast, and it covers many topics that are linked.

* At its heart, this is an analysis and discussion of how Macro Economics and Money Supply works in today's world, and it has significant policy implications. It will challenge what you think you know about US and Global Economic History and how Markets work. You will need an open mind to understand the linkages.

* I believe that I have proven the hypothesis that I postulated in 2009:
The Shah Theorum: "When One Economy Enters a Liquidity Trap, All Monetary Policy Fails Globally"
* I also connect Macro and Micro Economics through this analysis, at least for the special case of a Liquidity Trapped Economy.
Money Supply and The Failure of Macro Economics
Using the examples of the Japanese and US Economies, I show that:
* Under Liquidity Trap conditions, Interest Rate Policy and Management fails in the Trapped Economy, and has the opposite outcome from the one desired by policy makers.
* Cutting policy interest rates reduces money supply and exacerbates recessions. This has been the case for Japan for 23 years.
* Money Supply in a Trapped Economy declines due to the Export of Capital and Savings, as investors seek higher returns in other economies. A significant proportion of extra Money Supply that has been created from Quantitative Easing and other Non-Conventional Policy Measures is also exported.
* The Carry Trade connects micro and macro economics – decisions by individuals to maximize their returns by seeking higher returns elsewhere drives capital overseas, altering money supply.
* Money Supply and Velocity in a Non-Trapped Economy increases through receipt of capital from the countries that are in Liquidity Traps. (There is a corresponding decrease in broad money supply and velocity in the Trapped country.) This determines the size of the Carry Trade.
* Monetary Policy also fails in Economies that are receipients of Carry. They cannot control their money supply, and are subject to Asset Inflation from the import of capital. This is usually seen in Housing and Stock Market Prices. Rising asset prices increase debt issuance and leverage, further accelerating asset price growth. Economies become leveraged through debt issuance.
* If a Non-Trapped economy is already in a recession in spite of the receipt of Carry Money Supply, traditional policy measures such as cutting rates will have adverse impacts, as money supply will decline even more due to retraction of Carry.
* In other words, Monetary Policy fails in both Trapped Economies as well as Receiving Economies.
* Under Liquidity Trap conditions, the only way to increase Money Supply is through Quantitative Easing and increasing the size of Central Bank Balance sheets. This is highly inefficient as much of this will get exported, however, there is a chance some of the money supply thus created might remain resident.

The Pricing of Assets

* Under Liquidity Trap conditions, Asset Pricing in an Economy is determined by the Total Supply of Carry available.
* While it is widely accepted that asset prices are influenced by money supply, what has changed since 1994 is that it is money supply and carry from global sources that determines asset prices, not just local money supply.

* I define the Shah Carry Indicator that captures Global Carry, and explains the prices of many assets classes over long periods of time.
* Valuation metrics of assets, such as expected returns, are not necessary to explain asset prices and price movements.
* Different asset classes have different Beta’s or sensitivities to the Supply of Carry, but most Asset Prices are related.

Changes to Economic History - the US response to Policy Rates.
- analysis of 2001 to 2004
- analysis of 2007
Social Implications
* Birth rates in Trapped Economies vs Birth rates in growing economies
* Increases Income Inequality, as the owners of assets benefit in a leveraged manner. Leads to social unrest.

Why money supply growth has Stalled

* Peak Stuff

Japanese Reflation

* This will not happen until there are significant policy changes are made to re-patriate capital back to Japan, allowing it's money supply to inflate and thus create inflation.

* The "Japanese Reflation Trade" will not work under current economic system and economic policies.

Policy Suggestions

* These are made at the end. They are radical.

Further Analysis

* Trying to identify the trigger points at which Carry Flows reverse.

Genesis of this Analysis

I have been formulating this analysis of Carry Trades and Assets since 2006, when I first researched Carry Trades to understand the Icelandic economy. The magnitude of the Carry Trade emphasizes its impact on markets and its importance to Macro Economics, which heretofore has not been appreciated.

Many parts of this discussion are derived from my prior Crisis Notes (see the Archives) - I discuss the Carry Trade in almost every Crisis Note. The analytical framework that I have used since 1988 - that Hedging and Funding Costs and Flows determine Asset Valuation - has led me to research the supply of capital and the resulting impact on the prices of assets that are described herein. This is a very general framework that can be applied to any economy that is the recipient of Carry capital flows from a Funding Country or countries. I have been making the argument for many years that the US is the world's largest recipient of Carry Funding, primarily from Japan, and that the Global Financial Crisis was primarily a Carry Deleveraging event.

In this analysis I am consolidating and augmenting my thoughts, and am attempting a comprehensive, and hopefully definitive, analysis of Carry Trades: how and why they are the primary determinant of Asset Prices, Money Supply and Asset Inflation, squeezing out the real economy in the process, and rendering Monetary Policy impotent.

There are 3 major sections:

Carry Trades - describes the various sources of Carry (to the US) at different points in time
The Pricing of Assets - graphs showing the responsiveness of various US assets to Carry
Macro Economics - the impact of the Carry on Money Supply and the Transmission of Policy

It is Carry from all sources that determines Asset Prices, not Economic Stimulus from any single provider of Carry.

The analysis and conclusions that follow are purely my opinion and conjectures, based on data I have collected and inferences I have made. I have not had access to Central Bankers, policy makers, or officers of banks, to really know how and what decisions they were making. I have also been scouring the internet for knowledge on the subjects discussed, but the available information is sparse. It is quite possible that others have reached these conclusions before me, and might have also published on this topic, but I have not discovered any such sources.

Section 1: Carry Trades

“Carry Trade” is the term given to borrowing money in a low yielding currency (i.e. country), and investing the proceeds in the currency and assets of a higher yielding country, thereby earning a net spread, or carry.

Carry trades should never exist, as the economic concept of “Interest Rate Parity” should prevent any arbitrages from occurring. However, they do exist and are the most powerful force in Finance and Economics, as they thwart attempts by Central Banks to conduct monetary policy. The world as we know it today (since the early 1990s) has been sculpted by Carry Trades, and almost all asset prices are a result of asset inflation (and deflation) from deployment (and withdrawal) of Carry Leverage.

I do not understand why Economists have not modified their theories and macro economic policies to incorporate Carry Trades. My assumption is that, since carry trades should not exist due to no-arbitrage assumptions, economists think that they can be ignored, and thus continue to use their single-economy Keynesian models to manage policy. This is surprising, given the number of practicing economists that join or start Macro hedge funds that implement the carry trade.

In addition, I have even found discussion papers written for the Bank of Japan ("BOJ"), and also presented in the US, as recently as 2007, describing the Carry Trade, the export of capital, the funding of Hedge Funds in the US, and the ballooning of Credit in the US. Apparently they have been ignored.

In one of my incomplete 2009 Crisis Notes, I start to rewrite Macro Economics, and identified 'The Shah Theorem' (although it should be called a Hypothesis for now) that creates the Carry Trade:

When One Economy Enters a Liquidity Trap, All Monetary Policy Fails Globally

The primary result of Central Bank Keynesian stimulus policies, as exploited by Carry Trades, is to export capital, preventing desired monetary expansion and desired inflation in the funding country, and instead creating excessive money supply and asset Inflation in capital-receipient countries, effectively exporting inflation. ( I proposed a solution to this in one of my old Crisis Notes, but since it is unlikely to happen, I'll save re-discussing it for later.)

In my analysis, and in the "Shah Carry Indicator" that I have created, I define the term "Carry" more broadly than defined above. In my usage, "Carry" is defined as all sources of Money Supply that are NOT a result of conventional monetary policy. It includes money supply imported from Carry Trade deployment, but also incorporates forms of non-conventional financial policy that can increase money supply, such as Quantitative Easing, and will include more radical forms of money creation that might come in the future, such as direct injections into bank accounts.

In crime solving, they say, “Follow the Money”. This also applies to understanding financial markets. Without an understanding of the Carry Trade, investors cannot have an understanding of financial markets and risks, and functions such as Risk Management cannot be performed.

The Yen Carry Trade

The original modern Carry Trade was the Yen Carry trade, made famous and deployed to great effect in 1994 by Julian Robertson of Tiger Management ("Tiger"). It is quite likely that George Soros of Quantum, LTCM, other hedge funds, as well as Wall Street prop desks, were also using this strategy – as many lost money at the same time – but there is very little information available publicly about their specific activities.

The history of the Yen Carry Trade begins in the late 1980s, when, due to unconstrained money creation, Japanese asset prices appreciated greatly, and were part of a “bubble” economy. Subsequent deregulation of the banking system globally, and Samurai bond issuance rules in Japan (which I discuss in the Samurai bond Crisis Note) also played pivotal roles.

In 1989, The BOJ tightened monetary policy and raised its policy rate, continuing into 1990. In 1990, the bubble burst, and the Nikkei went from 38,915 to a low of 20,221 in 9 months. In 1991 and 1992, asset prices collapsed, resulting in large qualities of Non-Performing Loans (“NPLs”) at Japanese Banks, with numerous bank bankruptcies in 1995.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_asset_price_bubble

In a textbook Keynesian response to a financial crisis, the BOJ started cutting rates again, to allow banks to earn their way out of the crisis, and resulting in the creation of many ‘zombie banks’.

Japan’s policy rate crossed the US policy rate at 3% in October 1993, setting the stage for the Yen Carry Trade.

When, in March 1994, the US began to RAISE rates, following a recovery from the 1991 US recession, the Yen Carry trade started in earnest.

This resulted in a weakening of the Yen, an increase in borrowings from the BOJ by Japanese branches of Foreign banks, and a jump in issuance of both non-Yen demoninated debt in Japan, as well as Yen denominated debt by Foreign Issuers (Samurai and Euroyen) bond issuance. In addition Japanese retail investors started purchasing foreign currencies, foreign bonds, and trust vehicles denominated in foreign currencies, resulting in a massive export of capital and money supply out of Japan that has not been stemmed since.

The Yen Carry trade has not stopped funding the world’s productivity (or excesses) since then. In addition, we have also enjoyed periodic episodes of Dollar Carry Trade, and more recently to a minor extent, Euro Carry Trade, as both the Fed and ECB have effectively cut rates to zero. There are other countries with zero or negative interest rates, but their capital exports are not very scalable, so I won’t discuss them at this time.

All three major central banks have also embarked on Quantitative Easing to further increase money supply, in response to entering Liquidity Traps, providing more fuel for carry trades.

Due to the high leverage involved in Carry Trades, periodic periods of nervousness have led to the withdrawal of Carry Financing, leading to massive selloffs in Global markets: Leveraged Asset Growth comes hand in hand with Leveraged Downside.

Most periods of apparent de-correlation between Yen and various assets can be explained by changes in US Central Bank policy changes.

In addition, it must be kept in mind that the Yen Carry trade in the pre-Thai/Russia/Tiger/LTCM period was not well known. After Tiger made the news, the subsequent correlations of Yen Carry with financial assets increased, as did volumes in ancilliary measures, such as Repo and Margin.

The following chart shows the policy rates of the Bank of Japan (Unsecured Overnight Call Rate), The Federal Reserve Bank (Fed Funds Rate), and the European Central Bank (MRO – Main Refinancing Operations Rate).

This analysis will focus primarily the policies and impacts of the Japanese and US central banks, and the Japanese and US economies.

I thus define a new Indicator: The Yen Carry Indicator ("YCI"), which is the Fed Fund Rate minus the BOJ Call Rate. I later modify this to create the Shah Carry Indicator ("SCI") in order to generalize it and incorporate other sources of Carry, such as unconventional US money creation - primariliy QE. (This should really be called the "YCI-US"; the YCI for other countries will be the difference between their policy rates and Japan's).

Sources of Money Export from Japan

As Japanese rates declined, and economic conditions weakened, Japanese investors sought out higher returns in overseas markets. This export of capital and savings appears to be have been conducted by both retail investors as well as institutions, such as insurance companies and the Postal Pension system, and including, inadvertently, the Bank of Japan!

The Japanese retail investor has become famous, and she has been given a name by the press: "Mrs. Watanabe". In a victory for Micro Economics, rather than succumb to low returns on her savings from a low rate regime, she sought to maximize her returns and started trading Yen for other higher yielding currencies, as well as purchasing foreign currency denominated bonds and trust vehicles. This is discussed in previous Crisis Notes. I have not managed to fully identify and verify all the data that captures the "Watanabe flows", but they are that are usually quoted by journalists to be over $1T.

I have identified multiple sources of Money Supply Export from Japan:

- Foreign currency purchasing, notably Aussie$ and US$, but almost every currency in reality

- Trust investments in foreign currencies - such as US Equity funds

- Direct borrowings from the BOJ by Japanese branches of foreign banks, presumably transferred overseas through interbranch accounts

- Direct borrowings from the BOJ by Japanese banks, some of which funded lending overseas by their overseas branches

- Japanese market issues of bonds by Japanese corporations denominated in foreign currencies

- "Uridashi" bonds" - sales in Japan of foreign currency bonds issued outside of Japan

- "Samurai bonds" - issuances in Japan of Yen denominated bond by foreign issuers

- International Bonds issued in Yen

- Issuance of foreign currency or Dual Currency denominated bonds, sold in Japan, by Japanese corporations, and other issuers

- BOJ holdings of US Treasuries - QE operations - that in effect export capital to the US.

I have collected the following data about some of these outflows of capital from a variety of sources.

Borrowing by Foreign Banks from the BOJ

The Bank of Japan Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate ("Call") is an overnight rate, similar to the US Fed Funds Rate, at which banks can borrow from the BOJ, or lend to the BOJ. Using the BOJ Flow of Fund ("FOF") terminology, "Assets" are money lent to the BOJ, "Liabilities" are money borrowed from the BOJ. I have to thank this recently found BOJ paper for identifying this data - I had been looking for it for years! This data does not break out US Banks, so it is not as direct as one would like. (I discovered this data on 2/2/2016, after I had created the SCI and written most of this document - it is not directly incorporated into SCI, although it is implied by the YCI. )

The Samurai Bond Market link under Commentary gives extensive details about this market. I was alerted to the Samurai bond market when Lehman failed in 2008, and I read that 40+% of Lehman's debt was Samurai (I don't remember the source).

Over $210 Billion of Samurai bonds have been issued since 1990 (converted to USD at the time of issue).

Since the majority of the issuers were US financials, many of their bond liabilities could count as capital, allowing these issues to greatly increase bank balance sheets, thus flowing through into US money supply in a leveraged manner, through margin and commercial lending.

Prior to October 1993, Samurai issuance was sporadic. However, starting in October 1993, Samurai issuance increased dramatically, with $471mm being issued in that month. From January 1994 to January 2002, there was no month without Samurai issuance, with many months with greater than $1.5bb being issued. Supply in this first wave from 1994 to 1997 peaked in 1996, as word of this strategy spread to more participants, I presume. Issuance slowed as the Asian financial crisis was triggered in 1997. When the Fed cut rates in late 1998, after LTCM and the Russian Crisis, Samurai issuance slowed drastically. Large scale Samurai issuance resumed in 1999 after the Fed raised rates, while the BOJ cut rates once more to 0.1% , and also embarked on Quantitative Easing (“QE”), which I describe below. This persisted till 2007!

The euroyen market is also another source of borrowing for issuers, but starting in the 1990s, the samurai market began dominating the euroyen market.

In addition, a Hedge Fund’s prime broker could easily borrow in Yen from Japanese banks or Japanese branches of US Banks, as Japanese money supply had expanded while Japanese C&I lending had not, resulting in excess non-earning deposits. I have not yet figured out how to fully identify and measure the size of this more direct Yen Carry funding.

Uridashi Bonds

I might write a separate article on this, similar to the Samurai Bond Market article, since I have the data for this market. For now, here is a summary.

Infomation on this market is sparce, and I only learned of the term and the existence of this market less than two weeks ago, in February 2016. Here are some articles I have found on the internet.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uridashi_bonds

http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/john-needham/uridashi-the-bubble-buster

http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-01-24/japans-bond-investors-like-to-buy-foreign

From wikipedia:

An Uridashi bond is a secondary offering of bonds outside Japan. They can be denominated in Yen or issued in a foreign currency. These bonds are sold to Japanese household investors. An Uridashi bond is normally issued in high-yielding currencies such as New Zealand Dollars or Australian Dollars in order to give the investor a higher return than the historically low domestic interest rate in Japan.

During the 2008 financial crisis the carry trade and foreign currency bonds in general came under criticism in Japan for contributing to the crisis.
On the 1st of November, 2015 the size of the Uridashi Bond Market was USD 33.2bn equivalent in 15 different currencies.

These bonds have been creating housing and stock market inflation in New Zealand and Australia, and apparently the NZ Central Bank has been complaining about them to Japan, to no avail.

This graph shows the balance of Uridashi bonds denominated in USD (excluding dual currency USD bonds). About one-third of all Uridashi bonds currently are in USD. The average maturity is 5.2 yrs, with the minumum maturity of 1 yr, and max of 30 yrs.

The responsiveness of Uridashi issuance to the incentive from the rate differential measured by the YCI is almost perfect! This is microeconomics in action!

Quantitative Easing (QE) and Central Bank Balance Sheets

Quantitative Easing is considered an 'unconventional' monetary policy, and is used to increase money supply when conventional tools have become ineffective (i.e. rates are at zero), in other words when an Economy is in a Liquidity Trap.

Wikipedia has a good definition for QE, so I will use it:

Quantitative easing (QE) is a monetary policy used by central banks to stimulate the economy when standard monetary policy has become ineffective. A central bank implements quantitative easing by buying financial asets from commercial banks and other financial institutions, thus raising the prices of those financial assets and lowering their yield, while simultaneously increasing the money supply.

All three major central banks have resorted to QE, at different points in time, after entering Liquidity Traps. The extent of QE that they have implemented can be measured by the size of their (ballooning) balance sheets. The following chart shows the magnitude of their balance sheets (in USD). Combined, they currently total $8.5T, of which approximately $7.5T is as a result of QE.

Japan was the first country to enter a Liquidity Trap, and to implement QE. However, in addition to purchasing Japanese assets on its Balance Sheet, the BOJ also purchased a significant amount of USTs - $400B between 2001 and 2004. While these investments were meant to deploy its Balance of Payments Surplus, the BOJ inadvertently supplied QE to the US, increasing US money supply. This was fortituous, as the YCI had declined during this period due to the Fed cutting rates - this QE from the BOJ, more than made up for the decline in Samurai, Net Call, and other forms of Japanese Carry.

I believe this to have been an important factor in the 2003 recovery in the US, resulting in a long rates rally, and playing a part in the mortage refinancing boom that occured, as well as not only limiting the decline in the US stock market, but also helping it turn around and rally.

Without the contribution of this QE in the 2001-2004 period, the YCI projected a lower SPX index. The SCI incorporates this Japanese QE, and as a result tracks the SPX!

When US QE was implemented, I had discussed my opinion as to why QE cannot work to recover asset prices, in the section called 'Bonds are not Assets' in the 2009 Crisis Note 'Excess Assets, Keynes, etc'. However, I missed that QE can directly increase the money supply by the amount of bonds purchased. The risk to QE is that much of the money supply created will get exported overseas, which also happened in the US in 2008 (and was discussed in another Crisis Note). What has surprised me has been the amount of QE the Fed has implemented - its Balance Sheet has increased by $4T!

While the ECB's activities have not been very relevant to US asset pricing to date, Mr. Draghi's recent comments to 'do what it takes' might change the ECB's contribution to Carry Trades and US asset pricing. ECB data is being shown for that reason, although it has not been incorporated into the Shah Carry Indicator as yet.

1993-1998: The Yen Carry Trade

This was the period that made the Yen Carry Trade both famous and infamous.

This trade is considered to be the most profitable trade in the history of hedge funds - by borrowing money in Yen at very low interest rates, and investing it in other countries, initially and sizable in the US, but soon in many other market as well, such as Russian, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, Iceland, etc. they were able to leverage their capital many times over at close to zero financing rates.

In the US, this resulted in a jump in margin borrowing, and a change in trajectory of the S&P Index in November 1994 (a “hockey stick”), starting a rally in US markets that continues even today, with interruptions in 2000 and 2007.

A number of important trigger events occurred in this period, and are represented on the charts that follow as vertical lines with the following legends:

A: October 1993 - Yen Policy Rate Crosses US Policy Rate, signalling the availability of Carry Trades

B: July 1997 - Asian Crisis starts, with the failure of Thai markets

C: November 1997 - LTCM Peaks and begins failing

D: August 1998 - Russian Crisis Starts

E: September 1998 - 9/23 - LTCM is bailed out; 9/28 - Fed Funds are Cut

F: October 1998 - 10/7 to 10/8 - Tiger Management loses $2BB in one day; $5BB since 9/28

Prior to October 1993, Samurai issuance was sporadic. However, starting in October 1993, Samurai issuance increased dramatically, with $471mm being issued in that month. From January 1994 to January 2002, there was no month without Samurai issuance, with many months with greater than $1.5bb being issued. Supply in this first wave from 1994 to 1997 peaked in 1996, as word of this strategy spread to more participants, I presume. Issuance slowed as the Asian financial crisis was triggered in 1997. When the Fed cut rates in late 1998, after LTCM and the Russian Crisis (D), Samurai issuance slowed drastically. Large scale Samurai issuance resumed in 1999 after the Fed raised rates, while the BOJ cut rates once more to 0.1% , and also embarked on Quantitative Easing (“QE”), which I describe below.

The Role of Tiger Management (and other "Macro" Funds)

It had been known that Julian Robertson of Tiger was using the Yen Carry trade, and was the largest Macro Hedge Fund at the time, and that he was using leverage, but until Tiger blew up in the wake of the Russian and LTCM crises, the magnitude of the importance of the Yen Carry Trade, and Tiger, has never been quantified.

Quoting from the Paul Krugman link earlier in this post,

...Tiger Management, until recently the largest such fund in the world. In its heyday in the summer of 1998, Tiger had more than $20 billion under management, considerably more than George Soros' Quantum Fund, and was reputed to be even more aggressive than Quantum in making plays against troubled economies. Notably, Tiger was perhaps the biggest player in the yen "carry trade"--borrowing yen and investing the proceeds in dollars--and its short position in the yen put it in a position to benefit from troubles throughout Asia. But when the yen abruptly strengthened in the last few months of 1998, Tiger lost heavily--more than $2 billion on one day in October--and investors began pulling out. The losses continued in 1999--from January to the end of September Tiger lost 23 percent, compared with a gain of 5 percent for the average S&P 500 stock. By the end of September, between losses and withdrawals, Tiger was down to a mere $8 billion under management.

http://money.cnn.com/1998/11/02/companies/tiger/

From the link above we know the following:

- Tiger lost $5.5B between September and October 1998

- Tiger lost $2.1B in September 1998

- Tiger lost $3.4B in October 1998

- Tiger lost $2BB in one single day in October

- Tiger had 5.5:1 leverage

I use this information to understand the importance of Tiger to the US stock market. Here is what happened:

From the data, we know that the single day $2B loss probably occured on 10/7 to 10/8, when the Yen/$ moved from Y130.03 to Y121.3, a strengthening of Y8.73 (-6.71%), while the SPX went from 970.68 to 959.44 and lost 11.24 (-1.1%).

Looking at the 9/23/98 to 10/7/98 period, Yen/$ went from Y135.63 to Y130.03, strengthening by Y5.6 (-4.13%), apparently losing $2.1B for Tiger. In this period the SPX was also selling off, losing 95.41 (8.95%), from 1066.09 to 970.68.

We do not know specifically that Tiger was invested in the S&P - the SPX is a proxy for US assets.

Solving these simultaneous equations, we deduce that Tiger's position in Yen was approximately $27.98 billion, and the position in S&P was approximately $10.55 billion! This does not make any assumptions about leverage or changes in leverage, we are just trying to estimate the sizes of the risks involved.

S&P volume was typically around 600mm in the periods prior to this volatility. From 9/23 to 9/30, SPX volume increased to around 700mm, and from 10/1 to 10/7 was between 700mm to 800mm. On 10/8/98, SPX volume spiked to 1.159B shares.

Between 10/7 and 10/8, 250,800 extra shares of the SPX traded over the prior days, with an 11.24 point decline for the day. Those shares had $2.818B realized loss on the SPX, on an invested amount of $243BB.

The jumps in volume suggest that Tiger and other similar funds were responsible for a significant percentage of the volume in the stock market in that period. This period also revealed other "Macro" funds that were playing in this trade, when their losses came to light.

http://money.cnn.com/1998/10/27/companies/soros/

Given that there were many other large "Macro" funds also investing in this period, I am standing by my opinion that the asset rally in the US from 1994 onwards was fueled by the Yen Carry Trade, and not by anything else Mr. Greenspan or the President might have attributed it to, such as a "New Economy".

And all economists that proclaimed that "the state of macro is good" or that "the central problem of depression-prevention has been solved" were dead wrong, as were their critics; in fact, Macro Economics had failed, and the problem was really simpler than one can imagine.

Yen Carry and the Stock Market

From the Samurai market graphs above, it is clear to see that, post 1994, as the Yen weakened, along with Samurai Bond issuance, the SPX rallied. The Yen strengthening after the Russian Crisis should have normally been a negative for Samurai issuance. Instead Samurai Bond Issuance picked up, since the Yen strength was offset by an increase in the Fed Funds rate, as well as the start of QE in Japan - this subtlety is captured by the YCI. As a result, the SPX resumed its rally in 1999.

Margin Debit balances in Margin accounts also increased.

1999 to the Present: The Yen and Dollar Carry Trades

Starting in 1999, BOJ's Call rate was close to zero, starting a decade of Zero Interest Rate Policy or "ZIRP".

Japanese institutions, like Insurance companies and the Postal Pension system, also started investing in overseas assets.

In addition, "Mrs. Watanabe", the legendary Japanese housewife, (i.e. Japanese retail investors) also started trading Yen for other currencies, notably Aussie$ and US$, for yet more Carry Trades. This is discussed in previous Crisis Notes; the 'Watanabe flows' that are usually quoted by journalists to be over $1T.

The BOJ also started deploying QE, adding more potential capital that could be exported, and this had a significant impact on US Economic activity from 2003 to 2005. This is discussed in the Interest Rate Swaps article, and will also be discussed in more detail below.

Between Yen borrowing by banks, Samurai Bonds, Japanese QE, and Mrs. Watanabe, the Yen Carry Trade continued to fund the world, and especially the US. As Japanese money supply was primed, it searched far and wide for investments that would earn more than Japanese Assets. Thus began the phase that led to the Global Financial Crisis ("GFC") - after the supply of available investments was exhausted, assets were being created (notably Subprime and CDOs) to feed the voracious appetites of Carry Traders, further leveraged by Basel rules.

In addition, the US Dollar Carry trade started in earnest after 9/11/2001, as the Fed cut rates from 2001 to 2004. During this period, the Yen Carry Incentive shrank, and I suspect the US became a source of Capital for other countries. This will be explored in Section 3 below. When the Fed raised rates again in 2004, Japan once again became the dominant supplier of capital to the US.

As described in the analysis of Interest Rate Swaps article, it was the transfer of the BOJ's QE and increased purchasing of USTs in 2003 that lowered longer US interest rates, including mortgage rates, thus exporting Japanese Money Supply to the US, and leading to the Mortgage refinancing boom and changes in US Swap Spreads during this period. This in turn also enabled the appreciation of other US Assets, including Equities.

The Yen Carry Trade continued unabated until US Asset prices started collapsing in 2007. You can easily spot the Deleveraging that occured in 2008! There is more discussion of this in the Money Supply section that follows.

In 2008, the Fed also started using QE, in addition to cutting rates again in 2007, once again triggering Dollar Carry, much of it to the Emerging Markets (discussed in this Crisis Note).

The Yen Carry Trade Indicator (YCI) will be a less effective measure for this period due to the additional sources of Carry, from both Japan and the US, and marginally the ECB. Since Japan has been in ZIRP for a long time, the YCI resembles the Fed Funds Rate. After 2009, when the US cut rates to Zero too, the YCI also went to zero.

There was some Samurai bond issuance after the YCI went to zero. This was primarily from financial institutions that had been bailed out that needed more capital. US markets and investors were still in shock, or wanted to export capital to EM for higher yields, whereas it appears that Japanese investors were still willing lend to US financials, who borrowed money where they could. (For more details, see the Samurai Bond Note).

As you can see below, Carry from Samurai bonds alone does not explain the price action of the US Stock market, although there is a link.

I therefore created the "Shah Carry Indicator" described below to incorporate other forms of Carry.

Source: Bloomberg, MBS Mantra, LLC

The Shah Carry Indicator ("SCI")

The YCI is not a direct measure of the money supply that can be exported by a Trapped Economy; it is a measure of financial incentive to deploy available capital and money supply to another Economy. When a Trapped Economy creates additional Money Supply through unconventional policy measures such as QE, this newly created money supply can also be immediately exported, but is invisible to the YCI - the YCI does not capture the creation of this additional money supply due to the policy rate already being at or close to zero.

For the SCI, I define the term "Carry" more broadly than the typical definition. In my usage, "Carry" is defined from the perspective of the economy that is receiving extra money supply, and includes all sources of Money Supply that are NOT a result of conventional monetary policy for that country. It includes money supply imported from Carry Trade deployment and foreign QE, but also incorporates domestic forms of non-conventional financial policy that can increase money supply, such as domestic QE, and will include more radical forms of money creation that might come in the future, such as direct injections into bank accounts.

I also include Samurai bonds - while the incentive to originate them should derive from the YCI, they are a more powerful form of capital import than shorter term lending, from the US perspective, as they can count as capital for US banks, and therefore can increase the velocity of money and thus have a multiplicative impact on money supply. They become less important after 2008 as the velocity of money in the US drops.

I considered adding an Abenomics flag to the SCI (after 2012), as it this Japanese governmental policy to devalue the Yen might be forcing Japanese investors overseas. However, this will have a greater impact on Japanese money supply, and less on the US money supply and SCI, which, after 2008, is dominated by the Fed's QE. It should be included in an SCI-Japan.

In its current form, the SCI is a linear combination of the YCI and weighted carry sources, and the number is generates does not have a direct interpretation. It is not quite a measure of quantity, or of incentive - at present, we are looking to it solely for identifying relationships and potentially testing for predictive power.

Sources: FED, BOJ, Bloomberg, MBS Mantra, LLC

This is a temporary definition - ideally, it would be a direct measure of money supply or changes in Money Supply, but until the data supplied by governments becomes more granular, this might not be possible.

This initial version of the SCI is from the perspective of the US Economy, and in spite of not being a very refined model, has quite good explanatory power for a variety of assets and economic indicators.

The graph below compares the SCi and YCI to the S&P Index. As you can see above, the modifications to the YCI have dramatically improved the measure.

That it is has nothing to do with traditional financial and asset modeling inputs, such as expected returns, discount rates, etc, makes it all the more interesting.

The responsiveness of Japanese sources of Carry to the YCI and SCI

The divergence between the YCI and SCI after 2008 comes largely from the Fed's Balance Sheet operations - domestic QE - which has reduced the need for US financial institutions to borrow from the Japan. This shows up below in the Net Call Liabilities of Foreign Banks, where the YCI has better explantory power.

The divergence between the YCI and SCI after 2008 comes from the Fed's Balance Sheet - domestic QE, which has reduced the need for US financial institutions to borrow from the Japan. This shows up below in the Net Call Liabilities of Foreign Banks.

Summary:

The Primary Carry Trade that exports capital from Funding Countries to Carry Recipient countries is the Yen Carry Trade. Capital is exported from Japan primarily by:

Yen Borrowing or Selling - Funding in Yen through banks, plus currency trading of of Yen for other currencies (Mrs. Watanable)
Japanese Purchases of Bonds and Trusts denominated in foreign currencies (including EuroYen bonds).
Samurai bonds issuance by American financial institutions, increasing bank capital and leveraging the balance sheets of US banks.
Quantitative Easing by the BOJ, exporting capital both directly (purchasing foreign Sovereign bonds) and indirectly (injecting money in to Japan's economy by purchasing JGBs, which then gets exported by the Japanese - see #2 above).

The data above shows that there is quite a good responsiveness to export capital from the incentive to export - the YCI - and that many sectors and institutions of the Japanese economy, including the central bank, help export its capital.

Section 2: The Pricing of Assets

In this section we will compare the Shah Carry Indicator to a variety of Assets and economic indicators.

While it is widely accepted that asset prices are influenced by money supply, what has changed since 1994 is that it is money supply from global sources that determines asset prices, not just local money supply.

Please don't expect perfect correlations to all assets - there are other factors at work, such as hedge/leverage ratios that move with volatility.

Many of these graphs show that different beta's, or sensitivities, apply to different assets. The SCI has some explantory power for the prices of most asset, with greater linkages for financial assets.

We have already seen the close relationship to the S&P 500 Index above. At the margin however, the Yen alone precisely explains micro movements in the S&P daily, tick by tick, day by day, suggesting to me that the S&P (and the US stock market) is controlled by Program and Algorithmic Trading, using the Yen as the funding and hedging source.

Yen and S&P intraday

Here is data from last week. Note that you need to make the trading hours the same on Bloomberg if you want to pull up the charts yourself. In previous notes, you'll find some intraday graphs from other periods.

Correlations using daily closing data get lower, possibly because of misalignment of closing prices, or changing hedge ratios in response to changes in the VIX, or maybe other factors. This is something I will study later to see I can model a hedge ratio with greater precisely.

SCI and the S&P 500 Price Earnings Ratio

Certainly correlated, but not as well as the Index itself - needs some beta/leverage adjustment maybe? There are studies that suggest that hedge ratios do change with movements in volatility and trend directions. There appears to be some concern in the markets that the current PE Ratios (and the resulting GAP to the SCI) are a result of financial engineering and buybacks of stock, and are limited in their stability, in which case they might come back more in line with the SCI (i.e. rise, indicating current underestimation of PEs.)

Source: Bloomberg, MBS Mantra, LLC

As a bond market participant, I find this very interesting.

The 2yr UST tracks the SCI during the 2000 to 2008 period, as both followed the decline in the Fed Funds rate.

As I pointed out in the Interest Rate Swaps article, there is a link between the 10yr UST, Refi index, and BOJ's balance sheet holdings of USTs. which I suspect was responsible for at least some of the 10yr rally in 2002-2003 period. When the BOJ stopped buying USTs, the 10yr-2yr slope steepened until the Fed raised rates again.

Post Crisis, as the Fed became the dominant buyer of USTs for its QE Balance Sheet, bonds prices became more correlated to the SCI (their yields declined as SCI increased), with US QE lowering rates as well as increasing SCI.

SCI and Interest Rate Swaps (and LIBOR)

Source: Bloomberg, MBS Mantra, LLC

Another very interesting chart - the SCI is highly correlated with Swap Spreads in the Pre-GFC period.

Based on the timing of BOJ purchases of USTs between 2001 and 2004, and Samurai bond issuance, my interpretation is the following: the BOJs purchases of USTs lowered longer rates as well as injected money supply into the US economy. The BOJ also increased purchases of JGBs, injecting money into the Japanese economy. Sellers of JGBs to the BOJ replaced them with higher yielding Samurai bonds and other US securities, further injecting money supply to the US, as well as capital to the banks. Banks were able to use the Samurai supply to increase bank lending and their balance sheets. Interestingly, both 10yr and 30yr swaps had tightened during the rally from 2001, suggesting demand for spread products.

The combination of increased availability of funds with lower rates led to the mortgage refi index spiking upwards as the current coupon mortgage declined. Although 30yr swaps spreads are not on this graph (they are in a similar graph in my recent Swap Spreads article), 10 years swaps also widened to 30yr swap spreads, in spite of both tightening to USTs, indicating increasing supply of MBS.

When the BOJ started reducing its UST purchases in March 2004, 10yr yields immediately went up in March 2004, the current coupon mortgage went up, refi's dropped, and 10yr swaps spreads widened by 20bps.

This rise in rates appears to have everyone by surprise. The most coherent explanation I found was from Wells Fargo:

... For one, market yields had increased quite sharply in anticipation of Fed tightening in 2004. Market yields were much lower in mid-March 2004, before investors began to worry about a change in Fed policy. Some yields increased as much as 100 bps between mid-March and late-June.

"Worry about a change is Fed policy" was the best explanation I have found for this rise in rates in March 2004. The BOJ's balance sheet was not on anyone's radar back then.

Mr. Greenspan did not raise the Fed Funds rate till June 2004.

Source: Bloomberg, MBS Mantra, LLC

SCI and Crude Oil

Not surprisingly, SCI explains most of Crude Oil's price history. One might argue that Carry (via the High Yield and CLO markets) gave the industry the capital to develop shale in the US, leading to the current price collapse. It is instructive to remember that Oil was at $20 before the Carry Trade started, and for most of the 1990s.

Oil and commodities in general above seemed to have started declining when QE3 was implemented, around September 2011. These markets seem to have taken Bernanke at his word, and commodities have sold off since then.

"The weak job market should concern every American. It imposes hardship on people.."

Section 3: The Failure of Macro Economics

In this section, I will explain what Central Bankers are attempting to accomplish with Monetary Policy, look at it's effectiveness in today's economic world structure, and look at what they actually do manage to accomplish. I use the examples of the Japanese and US economies, and the policy decisions of each country, in this analysis.

A Summary of Monetary Policy

Central banks mostly attempt to manage money supply in order to control prices and target inflation. Some central banks have other mandates, such as employment targets and currency management, but the tools used are similar.

The ECB has put up a nice chart describing the Transmission of Monetary Policy. So have other sources.

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/transmission/html/index.en.html

In a prior Crisis Note, I summarized the Bank of England's white paper titled 'The Transmission of Monetary Policy'. I don't agree with it, but it gives a good picture of what central banks believe and are attempting to achieve. Here it is again:

- Central banks derive their power from the fact that they are monopoly providers of “high powered” money (base money).
- Central banks choose the price (rate) at which they lend high powered money to the private sector - the Policy Rate eg. Fed Funds Rate or Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate.
- This official rate is transmitted to other market rates via the banking system to varying degrees, and impacts assets prices and expectations, as well as the exchange rate.
- These changes in turn effect spending, savings, and investment behavior, which impacts the demand for goods and services.
- Monetary policy works via its influence on aggregate demand in the economy. Monetary policy thus determines the general price level, and the value of money i.e. the purchasing power of money. (Inflation is thus a monetary phenomenon. )
- Changes in the policy rate lead to changes in behavior of both individuals and firms, which when added up over the whole economy generate changes in aggregate spending.
- Total domestic expenditure in the economy is equal to the sum of private consumption expenditure, government consumption expenditure and investment spending. This, plus the balance of trade (net exports) is equal to GDP.
- Monetary policy changes affect output and inflation, as well as inflation expectations. - Inflation expectations influence the level of real interest rates and so determine the impact of any specific nominal interest rate. They also influence price and money wage setting, and so feed into actual inflation in subsequent periods.
- Money supply plays a role in the transmission mechanism of policy, but is not a policy instrument nor a target, as the central bank has an inflation target, and uses monetary aggregates as indicators only.
- There is a positive relationship between monetary aggregates and the general level of prices. - “Monetary growth persistently in excess of that warranted by growth in the real economy will inevitably be the reflection of an interest rate policy that is inconsistent with stable inflation. So control of inflation always ultimately implies control of the monetary growth rate. However, the relationship between the monetary aggregates and nominal GDP ..appears to be insufficiently stable (partly owing to financial innovation) for the monetary aggregates to provide a robust indicator of likely future inflation developments in the near term.”
- Shocks to spending can have their origin in the banking system, that are not directly caused by changes in interest rates
– Examples include declines in bank lending caused by losses of capital on bad loans: a credit crunch.

The tools of Monetary Policy are the Policy Rate, Reserve Requirements, Margin Requirements, and more unconventionally, Quantitative Easing and penalty (negative) policy rates.

Money Supply

There are a number of measures of Money Supply, depending on the country, from 'narrow' to 'broad'. Typically they are defined as follow:

- M1 is usually a narrow definition - coins and notes in circulation
- M2 is typically M1 plus short term bank deposits, savings and checking accounts, money market funds, etc.
- MZM - Money Zero Maturity - A measure of the liquid money within an economy. MZM represents all money in M2 less the time deposits, plus all money market funds
- M3 is M2 plus longer term deposits
- Some countries have even broader definitions.

Since Money Stock is relatively constant, each of these measures also has a 'Velocity' associated with it, which needs to be targeted to target inflation - "control of inflation always ultimately implies control of the monetary growth rate" - i.e. Velocity.

What is especially annoying is that the US Fed, in 2006, stopped measuring and publishing M3. I find this very suspicious, as I believe that the DIFFERENCE between M3 and M2 is critical for understanding the monetary forces at play in the economy. The public reason for not measuring M3 anymore was to save money, since the Fed claims that M2 explained everything they needed, and M3 did not add any more explanatory power. To which I answer: "Rubbish", along with some more colorful words.

As you will see later, M3-M2 was on a rocket-like vertical trajectory in 2005-2006. My speculation is that the Fed could not or did not want to explain this, resulting in the cancellation of M3. Had they looked at it more closely, they would have spotted the Financial Crisis brewing. I need to see if they published the minutes of the meeting leading to the cancellation of M3, or whether it was done more surreptitiously.

Japan, on the other hand, also has problems with it's M2 and M3 data. The current official measurements were changed in 2003. The prior M3+CD series ended in 2008, and the prior data I have found from other sources is not 'good' - the OECD Japan M3 specifically looks doctored. The data makes it hard to get a good long term view of the issues.

Quantity Theory of Money

Simplistic, but good enough to understand central bank thinking.

MV = PQ

M = quantity of money

V = Velocity

P = Price Level

Q = Real GDP - quantity of real goods sold

Since M is usually stable, increasing Velocity will lead to inflation in P, and often, more resources allocated to increasing the quantity of real goods produced. Alternatively, you can increase M by printing money or increasing the Money Supply (QE is one way).

To generate Velocity of Money, the banking system is necessary and critical, as velocity is generated through the Fractional Reserve banking system, through Loans for Productive uses that then recycle back through the economy.

So, to generate Velocity, Lending is important, as is Productive goods production.

A criticism of the Quantity Theory of Money comes from Paul Samuelson (in reference to assumptions about velocity).

In terms of the quantity theory of money, we may say that the velocity of circulation of money does not remain constant. “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink.” You can force money on the system in exchange for government bonds, its close money substitute; but you can’t make the money circulate against new goods and new jobs.

As an alternative, I describe the IS-LM model in this Crisis Note, but you can refer to any Macro Economics textbook. The objectives are similar - Policy Interest Rate management is used to increase money supply through velocity of money.

Targets of Monetary Policy

* Inflation Target
- There are 3 types of inflation that matter
- - Goods Price Inflation
- - Wage Inflation
- - Asset Inflation
* Full Employment
- - measuring employment and unemployment is a favorite sport of economists
- - the headline unemployment number does not represent reality
* GDP growth
- - we need to look into the components of GDP growth.
- - it is relatively easy for an administration to increase the size of government, but if it is not productive, it will not lead to Velocity of money.

Part 3A: Japan

Japan's Failure to Achieve Desired Results from Keynesian Macro Economic Policies

As desribed above, Japan entered a recession in 1984-1985, and has been struggling to get out of it every since. While official statistics show 6 different recessionary periods since then, in my opinion the entire period from 1989 to the present has been defined by the collapse in the measures of money - M2 and M3 - in 1989. Since then, the BOJ, and the government, have tried every play and trick in the economist's handbook, with limited to negative success.

Here is the official BOJ Japan Money Supply chart with Recession Periods marked.

I have figured out how to estimate the total amount of Japanese capital and money supply exported to the US. I estimate this at at least $1.5T in 2007, and it is the withdrawal of this money supply and leverage from the US was primarily responsible for converting a US mortgage crisis into a Global Financial Crisis. More on this later.

Japan's Stimulus Measures

Japan has cut rates, deployed QE, increased government spending, given tax credits to zombie companies (loss making that would otherwise be bankrupt) to maintain employment, spent on unnecessary infrastructure, such as airports and bridges with almost no activity, and most recently, imposed negative rates on excess balances at the BOJ, signaled toughness to weaken the Yen, and reinvigorate exports, created measures to increase direct investment in Japan (Abe's three arrows), and probably others.

Conclusion - Japan

The trends displayed in the preceding sections would lead one to conclude that Japan's economic future looks bleak, in spite of so much "Stimulus" being directed at it's economy. This raises 2 questions:

- Why does Japan insist on continuing with "Stimulus" and currency weakening?

- Where is all the "Stimulus" going?

The answer to the first question has been given to me by my friend, Manish Aurora of Rational Investing, who has been thinking about, has modeled, and has been trading the Japanese Stock Market.

Paraphrasing him:

" The trouble is, Japan is 100 mm people on a few islands, and if they allowed their industrial base to hollow out, the country would become indefensible without projecting military strength throughout Asia, not to mention a banking system with significant resilience and reach as well."

In order words, Japan has no choice but to do whatever it can to survive or at least maintain the status quo, and if that means going into a bottomless pit of debt in order to remain a net exporter (so as to preserve its factories), it will do so.

The answer to the second question should be obvious from the first section - the Japanese Stimulus has been escaping Japan through the Carry Trade, as well as through the BOJ's purchases of Sovereign Bonds of other countries, providing unanticipated and uncontrolled Stimulus to other countries.

Source: Bank of Japan, Fed, Bloomberg, MBS Mantra, LLC

While both these measures are instantaneous measures of the response to YCI incentives (i.e. Flow numbers), only the Net "Call" Liabilities of Foreign Banks are also a Stock number as they are short term by nature.

To assess the reduction in Japanese money supply, one needs to look at outstanding balances for the various components of Money Supply Export.

This graph shows the outstanding balances of Samurai bonds at different points in time. This data is estimated, as it does not account for any call execution for callable bonds, or any the elimination of debt due to bankruptcies (eg Lehman). Since much of this was debt that could count as capital for banks and financial institutions, the impact on US money supply was likely magnified.

Poking around in Japan's Money Supply

The next step in our analysis is to see if we can identify this exported money in Japan's Money Supply data.

Since this money is not being carried out in suitcases, M1 should be relatively stable. Thus, any decline in money supply, that would otherwise be available to generate velocity and thus GDP growth, should be visible in the differences between M1, M2 and M3.

(It should be noted that this analysis is hampered to an extent by inconsistent data series and time periods provided by different sources. BOJ's latest version of M1, M2 and M3 for example, starts in 2003.)

M1, M2 and M3 all look relatively stable, not a good sign for the Japanese economy, as it indicates a low velocity.

Section 4: An Alternate Reality - When Japan supplies your Money, are Fed Fund Rate Cuts counterproductive.

Stressing the components of the SCI. - delete FF, delete Fed BS. Test the data around 9/11/01 and Lehman

The SCI and YCI-2 do a good job of explaining changes in money supply in the US. But the 2002 to 2003, and 2007-2009 periods were both periods of declining asset prices and declining Yen Carry Trade flows.

If the Fed funds rate had not been changed, the YCI Indiciator would have remained high, potentially continuing the flow of interbank Yen transfers and Samurai bond issuances, which in turn would have boosted M3, and thus US Asset Prices.

Policy Brainstorming

* Japan - separate internal currency that cannot be exported - only usable for consumption

* Japan - raise rates to reattract money supply

* Japan - shame investors into bringing money home.

* Japan - have an inverse death tax - all repatriated money will be multiplied for the next generation. This might increase birth rates.

* Japan - All domestic bond purchases get an extra principal payment on death from the BOJ.

* Japan - stop buying USTs.

* Internationally - trade pacts to have zero trade surpluses or deficits - prices and wages adjust to do so.

Carry Trades in the Press

There has not been much discussion of the Carry Trade in the US press or TV. Various news sources do mention it, but it is so infrequent, that I am not sure how seriously this reporting has been taken. None of seem to quite understand the magnitude and importance it has.

Forbes, on September 4, 2014, finally had an article on Carry trades, to discuss the impact they were having on Emerging Markets.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2014/09/04/carry-trade-the-multi-trillion-dollar-hidden-market/#739c63a0761c

Barron's has discussed it many times, and a google search for "yen carry" finds articles from a few days ago, August 2015, 2006 and 2001. The Barron's articles prior to 2007 had some interesting insights and quotes from prominent hedge funds, but the warnings appear to have gone unheeded.

http://www.barrons.com/articles/rout-reveals-monetary-policy-dependence-1440431848

http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB116596521970248130

http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB50001424052748704878904578539353020226698

http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB116138320226999437

http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB984177852792122822

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) had a primer in 2007 (that I missed at the time),

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117311273453827125

followed by this in 2012 - Yen Play is Blast from the Past

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812904577291651949362114

and some more articles since 2012.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324240804578414470218189706

http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/11/17/macro-horizons-japans-weak-gdp-puts-yen-carry-trade-in-focus/

The FT also does periodically refer to it, and David Pilling, the FT Asia Editor, is well aware of it.

In addition there have been numerous blog postings by a variety of people, so I am not the only one attempting to raise awareness of this issue, even though I discovered it on my own.

Much more discussion of Carry Trades occurred in the 1990s, especially after Tiger Management blew up in 1998 (discussed below). However, most of today’s current market participants, especially in the US, appear to be unaware of it.

Most economists that study the Yen and Japanese Financial Policies do so in the context of why Japan cannot create inflation, Liquidity Traps, Japan's Lost Decade(s), and Japan's fight against Deflation. Very few make the connection to the Carry Trade. For example:

http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0092.pdf

Paul Krugman is an US economist who us a Japan Expert, and he has discussed all the topics listed above, and the Carry Trade, but once again, does not appear to have connected the two.

http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/jpage.html

http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/1999/11/tigers_tale.html

Prior to 2012, the Yen, or Japan, were rarely mentioned in the Wall Street Journal or on American business TV, or acknowledged by economists, displaying American belief and even arrogance in the American economy being the dominant global economy and being isolated from other global forces, and having its own valuation metrics. As Paul Krugman points out, most economists in the 2000s, including Ben Bernanke, believed the Business Cycle and Macro Economics to be “solved”.

During the Great Financial Crisis, Australian newspapers and economists (especially Gerard Minack) were far more keenly aware of the underlying economic events than American papers and TV. There has been some progress on awareness of Yen (it now shows up on TV sidebars nowadays), with journalists still ignorantly identifying it as a ‘Safe Haven’ on days the markets are selling off, as opposed to THE cause for movements in US Stock markets.